THE THEORY OF STATE AND LAW

Copyright © by Barnabas D. Johnson

One of the first courses (often the first) studied in law schools throughout the Soviet Union, and still studied by entering students in post-Soviet law schools, is the famous — no, the infamous — Theory of State and Law (TSL).

The classical TSL focused (and still focuses) on "interior" and "exterior" functions of governance. The interior functions include the state budget, focused on enhancing the economic development of the country; the reduction of unemployment; the social protection of citizens; the improvement of public health and public infrastructures (transportation, water, sewage, electricity, gas, etc.); and law enforcement, especially the "struggle against infringement of laws" (but without discussion of whether the government is itself governed by law). The exterior functions include "maintaining mutually beneficial relations with foreign countries" and "defending the country against aggression.

Students are assured that "every country" understands and adopts the fundamental goals and institutions of law and government set forth in the TSL. Not surprisingly, during Soviet times the TSL did not give a whiff of attention to liberty, equality under law, and the need for an independent judicial branch to determine facts and apply law without fear or favor; the TSL did not mention the necessity for free and fair elections; and it was bereft of the history of constitutional democracy and the fundamentals of the Rule of Law.

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But what of today? What is taught as the ruling paradigm governing "state and law" more than a decade after the Soviet Union collapsed? Apparently the leading text thereon, by Khropaniuk, dated 1997, is essentially a recitation of the doctrines taught three decades ago during the Brezhnev era, a slight improvement over those taught during Stalinist times but still bereft of any awareness of the problem — the many problems, starting with the questions: What of liberty? What of the coevolved ideas and institutions of modern constitutional democracies?

While, unfortunately, no systematic study has been made of legal education in the former USSR, it appears that the TSL remains dogma throughout the region. When I lectured on this subject at Yerevan State University in 2001, I was confirmed in my impression that law students and their teachers remain unaware that the TSL — originating with Hans Kelsen and German legal positivists in the 1920s — was long ago abandoned in the West. In that sense, Soviet and post-Soviet legal education is "1920s German legal science" in a time-warp ... reflecting "government under political science" rather than "government under law" ... reflecting too much of Max Weber and not enough of Abe Lincoln.

Insufficient attention has been given to post-Soviet higher education generally. A recent World Bank report states that this "sector" is the most corrupt throughout the region. Arguably, based on my (admittedly anecdotal) evidence, post-Soviet legal education is the most corrupt segment of the educational sector. Candid acknowledgement of the corruption suffusing legal education in the post-Soviet region can hardly be divorced from consideration of the legal landscapes and mindscapes which this region must address.

There is an urgent need for a thoroughgoing review of post-Soviet legal education, leading to reforms that will take time, sensitivity, and deep awareness of contextual issues — including issues implicating "liberal arts" education reform in the former Soviet Union, Europe, the world. 

Liberal-arts education, properly understood, must constitute the "cultural foundation" of constitutional democracy.

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As a law teacher in Armenia, I found my students deeply committed to changing the "Soviet mentality" they saw as the fundamental problem. The key, it seems, had to do with understanding freedom: What is it, what is it for, why is it so crucial, and why was it so dangerous for the U.S.S.R.? My students were entranced by the following passage from Friedrich A. Hayek's book, The Constitution of Liberty (1960), at p. 32:

The benefits I derive from freedom are thus largely the result of the uses of freedom by others, and mostly of those uses of freedom that I could never avail myself of. It is therefore not necessarily freedom that I can exercise myself that is most important for me. It is certainly more important that anything can be tried by somebody than that all can do the same things. It is not because we like to be able to do particular things, not because we regard any particular freedom as essential to our happiness, that we have a claim to freedom. The instinct that makes us revolt against any physical restraint, though a helpful ally, is not always a safe guide for justifying or delimiting freedom. What is important is not what freedom I personally would like to exercise but what freedom some person may need in order to do things beneficial to society. That freedom we can assure to the unknown person only by giving it to all. ...  The argument for the freedom of some therefore applies to the freedom of all. But it is still better for all that some should be free than none and also that many enjoy full freedom than that all have a restricted freedom. The significant point is that the importance of freedom to do a particular thing has nothing to do with the number of people who want to do it: it might even be in inverse proportion.

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See Learning Empathy.

See Post-Soviet Law Reform and Legal-Education Reform

To be continued

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